Accidental Thinking
A model of serendipity's cognitive processes
By Wendy Ross
This post is based on
Ross, W. (2024). Accidental Thinking: A Model of Serendipity’s Cognitive Processes. Review of General Psychology, 28(3), 253-267. https://doi.org/10.1177/10892680241254759
Serendipity is at best a slippery concept. It is most often defined in retrospect when the outcome of a series of “happy accidents” is fully understood. However, this retrospective understanding makes it harder to understand the process from a scientific perspective as each tale is necessarily marked by survivorship bias: we mostly hear the success stories, not the many accidents that led nowhere. Furthermore, we rarely have direct controls, situations where we can compare what happens when the same kind of accident occurs under closely matched conditions (as provided by Barber & Fox in the 1958 paper “The Case of the Floppy Eared Rabbits” when two researchers had the same observation at the same time). Without such direct controls, we cannot tell which aspects of the proceeding events are necessary and which are sufficient.
This paper draws from various domains of serendipity research and work in creative cognition to propose a framework for understanding the cognitive processes that underlie how we process and use an accident in the environment to generate a positive outcome. This model positions itself uniquely within serendipity studies by moving beyond retrospection and personality traits. Instead, it proposes a testable, process-oriented framework that treats serendipity as more than something that happens inside the individual’s mind. According to the paper, this is key to understanding how accidental thinking occurs, is that rather than it being determined by the cognitive skills or personality traits of the individual, instead we can better see it as something that emerges from the dynamic interaction between a prepared mind and a changing environment.
The Serendipitous Cognition Model (SCM) suggests that serendipity is the result of three interconnected phases that extend across different time periods.
Rather than viewing the "prepared mind" as a fixed trait, the model proposes two fluid states which work together. First, our mind is always in an informational state built from experience, environmental scaffolding, and domain attunement. Crucially, this informational state is underpinned by cognitive markers left by previous failures, partial successes, and intriguing observations we did not follow up. These indices accumulate weight over time, priming us to recognise relevant accidents when they occur. This can explain why sometimes it takes time to notice the importance of an accident when it occurs and also why some environments facilitate the occurrences of serendipity. Alongside this, we are in a shifting attentional state that moves between engaged focus, exploratory curiosity, and neutral observation. Each state affects our likelihood of noticing unexpected events. Paradoxically, the deeply focused "flow state" may actually reduce serendipitous noticing, whilst frustrated exploration or curious wandering increases receptivity to environmental accidents. Many of us are aware of the phenomenon of inattentional blindness that was compellingly demonstrated by Simons and Chabris’ experiment asking people to count basketball passes and missing out on the gorilla! Such a phenomenon can explain why we often miss fortuitous moments.
For serendipity to occur, accidents must be noticed and more often than not this noticing is marked by a feeling of surprise. The surprise associated with serendipity is the surprise at something unexpected yet believable rather than something completely unanticipated. For example, Selene Arfini and colleagues memorably describe the difference thus:
“Fleming’s “Oh!” reaction was when he managed to frame and understand the antibiotic effect of a mold. He did not enter his laboratory to find a moldy culture singing the chorus of Mamma mia!: that would have sparked another kind of reaction.”
It is important to also note that whether something is surprising depends on the space in which we encounter it. Something can only be surprising if we expect something different. Whereas, many of us would have thrown away the mouldy petridish, Fleming knew that what was in there was not to be expected. This expectation is the person’s informational state.
The SCM model predicts that whether an accident gets noticed depends on the interaction between the agent's current informational and attentional states and the disruptiveness of the accident itself. Importantly, the SCM acknowledges "missed serendipity" which are those moments when accidents occur but fail to breach the threshold of conscious awareness. These still leave traces, strengthening future recognition and adding to the underlying prepared mind state.
Noticing isn't enough. True serendipity requires changing course to exploit the opportunity. This phase involves iterative cycles of judgement and amplification echoing process models of creativity and involving testing, refining, and socially validating the discovery. The SCM deliberately avoids a simple "eureka endpoint", instead portraying verification as an ongoing, distributed process involving other people and material tools. This leaves space for the same outcome to be judged as both serendipitous and non serendipitous from different perspectives and at different time points. To return to Fleming, the discovery and mass marketing of penicillin was serendipitous at one point in history but if it allows the spread of antibiotic resistant superbugs we may change our evaluation of the positive outcome of his observation.
The SCM's contribution extends in several directions:
For researchers, it generates testable predictions. For instance: Are accidents generated through one's own actions more likely to be noticed than presented ones? Do memory indices from prior "interesting failures" genuinely increase later recognition? Can we design experiments that track serendipity prospectively rather than relying on retrospective reports? I am currently working on research with Sergio Agnoli and Vlad Glāveanu profiling the nature of the surprise required to make the most of unexpected accidents and with Selene Arfini to understand more the attentional dynamics of the state of impasse. These empirical investigations are a direct result of the theorising in this paper.
For practitioners and organisations, the model suggests concrete interventions. If serendipity requires certain attentional states, we might cultivate exploratory rather than purely goal-directed activities. If environmental affordances matter, we might design workspaces that function as external repositories for "interesting but not yet useful" observations much in the same way that the artistic studio often functions. These repositories can be extended as we see with yellow card reporting in drug development. If amplification requires social structures, we might build cultures that support following up on unexpected findings even when they diverge from current goals.
For understanding thinking and creativity more generally, the SCM challenges the understanding that says that discovery is because of the actions of one genius person. Serendipity simply cannot be reduced to what happens "inside the head" because it requires the link between the mind and the world.
Author bio
Wendy Ross is cognitive psychologist and Programme Director of the BSc in Psychology at London Metropolitan University. Her research interests lie in serendipity, creativity and possibility from an extended and distributed cognition perspective.
Further reading on this topic
Ross, W., & Arfini, S. (2024). Impasse-Driven problem solving: The multidimensional nature of feeling stuck. Cognition, 246, 105746. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105746
Ross, W., Agnoli, S., & Glăveanu, V. (2025). Incongruent objects are surprising but do not inspire more original ideas. Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts.. https://doi.org/10.1037/aca0000829